Activist investors flex their biceps |
Date: Monday, June 18, 2007
Author: Louise Armitstead, Times Online
THREE weeks ago, Marcus Agius, chairman of Barclays, received a call from Nat
Rothschild of the New York hedge fund Atticus requesting a meeting.
The
timing seemed odd, given Agius was trying to execute the world's biggest banking
deal - the proposed £93 billion merger with ABN Amro. Because Rothschild is his
wife's cousin, however, Agius agreed.
But a few days later, on Monday,
June 4, Agius was swamped with work and called Rothschild to cancel, promising
to hook up for a chat when the bid was complete.
Rothschild refused to be
fobbed off and, rather than argue, Agius jumped in his car and headed to
Atticus' office in London's St James's. Even as Rothschild greeted him, Agius
had no idea that their meeting would threaten to torpedo Barclays' deal with ABN
completely.
Rothschild gravely handed Agius a letter signed by Timothy
Barakett and David Slager, chairman and vice-chairman of Atticus. Agius read
with astonishment a detailed demand for Barclays to drop its bid for
ABN.
"It is clear that you are not the best owner for ABN Amro's
sprawling collection of assets ... we share the market's concern that Barclays'
thirst for an acquisition will lead you to increase your already full takeover
offer. If you proceed we will vote against the deal and encourage others to do
likewise," the letter read.
Agius was furious - but careful not to
underestimate Atticus's determination. By Wednesday, June 6, Bob Diamond, head
of Barclays Capital, was dispatched to meet Slager in Atticus's headquarters in
Manhat-tan's Park Avenue while Barclays' chief executive, John Varley, met
Rothschild in London. The next day, a video conference call was set up between
Atticus and Naguib Kheraj, Barclays' former finance director running the bid.
Meanwhile, bankers from Citi-group were sent in on Friday afternoon, including
the bank's head of financial services, Hamid Biglari, with Gary Sheldon from the
New York office and Chris Williams who flew over from London.
But Atticus
refused to back down and published the letter, claiming to have the support of a
group of other shareholders. At a stroke, Barclays' deal was deemed to be in
jeopardy - hamstrung by one investor.
Barclays was not alone. In the past
three weeks, some of Britain's biggest companies have been caught out by
aggressive activists.
A series of "poison pen" letters have landed on the
board tables of Vodafone and Cadbury Schweppes from relatively small funds
demanding the companies' immediate break-up; and last month Martin Reid was
suddenly removed as chief executive of Log-ica CMG in the wake of investor
demands.
These moves came only a few months after the activist investor
TCI sent a letter to ABN demanding the bank's break-up and sparked what has
become a global bidding war.
Just as corporates thought investor
relations couldn't get any worse, last week it was announced that Third Point,
the New York hedge fund famed for its bullyboy treatment of corporate America
and use of scathing public letters, was planning to start its first European
fund.
Shareholder rights under UK company law have hardly changed since
the late 1980s. The big difference is the change in the shareholder register to
include a growing number of activists motivated by the rich rewards that turning
companies round can bring. Atticus, which has $17 billion (£8.6 billion) under
management, last year generated 35% returns.
Although more prolific in
America, investor rows are hardly new in Britain - few could forget Fidelity's
ruthless removal in 2003 of Michael Green, chairman-designate of ITV, while
Atticus itself was instrumental in toppling Werner Seifert at Deutsche Börse.
But corporates and their advisers have been shocked by both the proliferation of
cases and the boldness of the demands.
One senior banker said: "In recent
years, activism has evolved from a few quiet suggestions in a chairman's ear to
louder complaints about specific deal-related issues, such as price. What seems
different now is that activists are demanding to set a company's strategy and
agenda themselves."
Even Fidelity's Anthony Bolton - who has a reputation
for being the City's "Quiet Assassin" - has been spurred into public comment,
complaining that Cadbury Schweppes had bowed too easily to calls for it to break
up.
In March, Trian, an American hedge fund co-founded by the activist
investor Nelson Peltz, bought a stake of almost 3% in the British company. Three
days later Cadbury announced it would separate its American drinks operations
from its confectionery business.
Bolton said he feared this "could
represent a come-on to every corporate raider or activist investor". He added:
"I don't think that the relationship between UK companies and their shareholders
will ever be quite the same again."
Atticus's Slager said: "Directors
need to understand that they don't own the companies - we do. They shouldn't be
persuaded by individuals, but if the collective body is in agreement, they must
act."
Many argue that companies and managers have only themselves to
blame because the hedge funds are filling a vacuum left by inefficient,
foot-dragging directors and institutions.
But others are also
uncomfortable with the new activism. One objection is that activists demand a
far higher level of attention than their shareholdings deserve.
The most
obvious example is that of Vodafone where John Mayo, the former director of
Marconi, has exploited a little-known loophole of company law to use a tiny
stake - 0.0004% of the shares - to demand a complete break-up of the company.
Commentators have branded the attempt of Mayo - who has gathered some
heavyweight former investment bankers to help drive his investment vehicle ECM -
as wrong and absurd. The demands, which look set to be put on the agenda at
Vodafone's annual meeting, include forcing it to spin off its 45% interest in
Verizon Wireless, its US joint venture, and taking on additional debt of £34
billion.
While the loophole might be an extreme example, institutional
shareholders complain that financial derivatives - especially contracts for
difference (CFDs) where only 10% of a stake is actually paid for in cash - allow
hedge funds to wield power disproportionate to the actual risk they are taking.
The Association of British Insurers (ABI) has called for City regulators to
insist that hedge funds disclose their large positions at all times, not only
when they are bidding for a business.
Last week Atticus converted its
stake in Barclays from swaps to cash in answer to criticism that it should put
its money where its mouth is.
Atticus was also wrong-footed by
accusations that the fund was trying to block Barclays in order to protect the
bid from the rival consortium headed by Royal Bank of Scotland.
Atticus
remained silent as rumours flew that one of its managers had contacted the
broker Cazenove to buy RBS stock just days before its letter to Barclays was
published.
Slager told The Sunday Times: "We did have a small position in
RBS, but we sold it at the beginning of the week to avoid
confusion."
Activists are also charged with accusations of collusion
since in the most high-profile cases the same names - most frequently, TCI,
Atticus and Tosca Fund - are all present.
Peter Montagnon of the ABI said
the power of activists should not be overestimated. "Hedge funds only have a big
impact if they touch a nerve. And often they raise issues that have been the
point of discussion among institutional investors behind closed doors. In these
cases, their ideas quickly gain the acceptance of other shareholders - if not,
their demands go nowhere."
Equally, the size of the targets is not only
down to increased aggression but because some of the larger companies have
underperformed other sectors and are cheap.
Montagnon added: "The world
has changed with hedge-fund activists, but this doesn't mean institutions sit
around doing nothing. Instead, it is often a close relationship with
institutions that allows company directors to understand investor issues and
deal with them quickly - for instance, with Cadbury Schweppes or
ABN."
Niall Paul, head of equities at Morley Fund Management, said:
"People don't see the robust discussions held behind closed doors between us and
company directors, which often result in subtle strategic changes.
"Hedge
funds need publicity and noise to back up their small positions - we don't."
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